Silly briefwriting conventions: Overuse of parenthetical shorthand names

Some briefwriting conventions are downright silly. One of the silliest is the compulsion to parenthetically define shorthand names for all persons and companies mentioned in a brief. For example, when the only Flintstone mentioned in a brief is Fred, you’ll see the first reference to him as “Fred Flintstone (‘Flintstone’).” Similarly, you’ll see “State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (‘State Farm’)” even when it’s the only State Farm company mentioned in the brief.

Where did this silly briefwriting convention come from? It seems to have come from the world of contract drafting. Contracts require defined terms, including definitions of the parties. Contract drafters often find it useful to create a defined shortened form of a party’s name. An easy way to do this is to put the defined term in quotation marks and parentheses after the party’s name. See Kenneth A. Adams, A Manual of Style for Contract Drafting § 1.62 (2d ed. 2008). People see this in contracts, conclude that it’s the “legal” way to write, and transfer the custom to briefwriting.

A brief is not a contract. In a brief, you don’t need to create defined shortened names for everyone when there’s no risk of reader confusion. If Fred Flintstone is the only Flintstone mentioned in the brief, refer to him by his full name the first time he appears—without the parenthetical “(‘Flintstone’)”—and after that, just refer to him as “Flintstone.” Everyone will know you’re talking about Fred. No one will wonder whether you’re talking about Wilma.

The same goes for companies. The exception is when you have, say, two State Farm companies mentioned in the same brief. In that instance, you may need to define shorthand names to avoid confusion:

  • State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (“State Farm Auto”)
  • State Farm Fire and Casualty Insurance Company (“State Farm Fire”)

Don’t take my word for it. Listen to what Bryan Garner and the late Justice Scalia said about this:

Give the reader credit for having a brain—and show that you have one, too. Don’t leave your common sense at the door. If your brief repeatedly refers to the Secretary of Transportation and mentions no other Secretary, it is silly to specify parenthetically, the first time you mention the Secretary of Transportation, “(hereinafter ‘the Secretary’).” No one will think that your later references to “the Secretary” denote the Secretary of Defense, or perhaps your own secretary.

Antonin Scalia and Bryan A. Garner, Making Your Case: The Art of Persuading Judges § 44, at 113 (2008). See also Bryan A. Garner, The Elements of Legal Style §§ 4.5 and 7.4 (2d ed. 2002).


Dance with the issue that brung you.

Here’s a tip for U.S. Supreme Court practice that should be obvious: if the Court grants certiorari, brief the issue raised in your cert. petition. If you brief a different issue, your writ will be dismissed as improvidently granted. That’s what happened yesterday in Visa, Inc. v. Osborn, c/w Visa, Inc. v. Soumbos:

These cases were granted to resolve “[w]hether allegations that members of a business association agreed to adhere to the association’s rules and possess governance rights in the association, without more, are sufficient to plead the element of conspiracy in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act . . . .” Pet. for Cert. in No. 15-961, p. i, and No. 15-962, p. i. After “[h]aving persuaded us to grant certiorari” on this issue, however, petitioners “chose to rely on a different argument” in their merits briefing. City and County of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 575 U. S. __, __ (2015) (slip op., at 7). The Court, therefore, orders that the writs in these cases be dismissed as improvidently granted.

The same rule applies in the Louisiana Supreme CourtSee Boudreaux v. State, DOTD, 2001-1329 (La. 2/26/02), 815 So. 2d 7.


Civil appeals in the U.S. 5th: What are the odds?

The other day, while wandering around the U.S. Fifth Circuit’s web site, I came across this statistical snapshot for July 1, 2015 – June 30, 2016. Here are some of the numbers of interest to civil practitioners:

  • Reversal rate in private civil cases (U.S. not a party): 16.6%
  • Petitions for panel rehearing filed: 240
  • Panel rehearings granted: 3 (1.25%)
  • Petitions for rehearing en banc: 194
  • En banc rehearings granted: 7 (3.6%)

The lessons from these numbers:

  • The best way to win at the Fifth Circuit is to represent the appellee.
  • The time to win is on original reconsideration. The odds of turning it around on rehearing are almost as slim as the odds of a grant of certiorari by the Supreme Court.

Changes are coming to the FRAPs

As many of you probably know, several amendments to the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure are scheduled to kick in on December 1. You can read the amendments, as transmitted to Congress by the Supreme Court by following this link. Here is a skinny on the amendments most likely to affect civil appellate practitioners.

Rule 4(a)(4). Under this rule, the filing of certain post-trial motions suspends the time to file a notice of appeal. The amended rule makes clear that, to suspend the time to appeal, the motion must be filed timely according to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Rule 5(c), governing petitions for permission to appeal, is one of several amendments establishing word limits in lieu of page limits for papers filed in a court of appeals. Under the current rule, the petition is subject to a 20-page limit. Under the amended rule, the 20-page limit applies only to handwritten or typewritten petitions. A petition produced by computer is subject to a 5,200 word limit.

Rule 21(d), governing petitions for mandamus and other extraordinary writs, has been similarly amended. Under the current rule, the petition is subject to a 30-page limit. Under the amended rule, the 30-page limit applies only to handwritten or typewritten petitions. A petition produced by computer is subject to a 7,800 word limit.

Rule 26(c), governing computation of time, allows 3 extra days when service of a paper starts the clock and service is effected “unless the paper is delivered on the date of service stated in the proof of service.” The current rule is an anomaly; it says that a paper served electronically “is not treated as delivered on the date of service stated in the proof of service.” The amendment deletes the word “not.” The practical effect of this amendment is that parties who are served electronically will have 3 fewer days to file their appellee briefs and their reply briefs.

Rule 27(d)(2) governs the length of motions, responses to motions, and replies to responses. Under the current rule, motions and responses are subject to a 20-page limit, and replies are subject to a 10-page limit. Under the amended rule, the page limits apply only to handwritten papers. Motions and responses produced on a computer are subject to a 5,200 word limit, and replies are subject to a 2,600 word limit.

Rule 28.1(c), governing briefs in cross-appeals, has been amended to reduce the word limits. The word limit for the appellant's principal brief and appellant’s response and reply brief has been reduced from 14,000 words to 13,000 words. The word limit for the appellee’s principal and respons brief has been reduced from 16,500 words to 15,300 words.

Rule 29, governing amicus briefs, has been substantially revised to allow for filing of amicus briefs during the time the court is considering a petition for rehearing. New Rule 29(a), governing amicus briefs filed during the court’s initial consideration of a case, repeats the substance of current Rule 29. New Rule 29(b) governs amicus briefs filed after a party has petitioned for rehearing.

Rule 32, governing the form of briefs, has been amended to reduce the word limits. The word limits for a principal brief has been reduced from 14,00o words to 13,000 words. The word limit for a reply brief has been reduced from 7,000 words to 6,500 words (half of 13,000). If you have trouble squeezing your brief into these reduced word limits, there is some consolation: under new Rule 32(f), the signature block no longer counts against the word limit.

Rule 35 and 40, respectively governing petitions for en banc and panel rehearing, have been amended to establish word limits in lieu of page limits for petitions produced by computer. Under the old rules, all petitions for rehearing were limited to 15 pages. Under the new rule, the 15-page limit applies only to handwritten or typewritten papers. A petition produced by computer is subject to a 3,900 word limit.


Why the LASC sometimes denies meritorious writ applications

Today the Louisiana Supreme Court released its oral-argument docket for December. Eight cases are scheduled for oral argument. These include three civil cases, four criminal cases, and one lawyer-disciplinary case.

The docket is a reminder of why the Court often denies meritorious writ applications. Simply put, the Court has only a limited number of oral-argument slots. Some of those slots must be allotted to criminal cases and disciplinary cases, leaving only a few slots for civil cases. This means that, if your writ application nails one or more of the writ-grant criteria in Rule 10, the writ may still be denied. Your application is competing with perhaps dozens of equally meritorious applications for a limited number of oral-argument slots. Your case has to be not just important, but more important than the other cases competing for that limited number of slots.

I had a quick look at the three civil case on the December docket. One of them, Radcliffe 10, LLC v. Burger, involved a fractured decision from the First Circuit, sitting en banc, with no majority opinion on the dispositive issue and two dissents or partial dissents. Another, South Lafourche Levee District v. Jarreau, went to a five-judge panel in the First Circuit, resulting in two partial dissenting opinions. Lesson: a case with one or more dissenting opinions may be the one that emerges from the pack.


For “Bridging the Gap” participants, and anyone else who’s interested

This morning I gave my semi-annual CLE presentation on appellate practice for the Louisiana State Bar Association’s “Bridging the Gap” seminar, a program designed for newly minted lawyers. For those attending, and for anyone else who may be interested, here is the stuff I promised to upload:

As lagniappe, here are links to two entertaining articles by Judge Alex Kozinski of the U.S. Ninth Circuit:


High-quality appellate CLE in New Orleans

I’ve just learned that the next DRI Appellate Advocacy Seminar will be held in New Orleans on May 11-12, 2017. Here is a blurb by program coordinator Keith Whitson about what’s planned:

The 2017 seminar promises to be very special. This program features presentations on the impact of various technological advances on brief writing, certification of issues to a state court, and the role of insurance on appeal. We also will offer guidance on brief writing and preparation for argument in the context of en banc review, and discuss strategic considerations when the government is a party to your appeal. This year, we are adding a panel of in-house counsel, who will offer their insight on the appeal process and effective management of appeals. And for the first time, our highly-regarded mock argument will be held at the United States District Court, just blocks from our hotel.

If this is the kind of CLE you’re looking for, mark your calendars.


Writing for the ignorant reader

John Balestriere has an interesting post at Above the Law on writing persuasively for the reader who knows far less about your case than you do—that is, every judge, judicial law clerk, and court staff attorney who reads your brief. He reminds us that those readers have many more cases on their plates than we have on ours, and that the time they can spend reading a brief is measured in minutes, not hours.

 For more on this topic, read this October 2014 post on the curse of knowledge.


To writ or not to writ?

In our last post, we looked at instances in which the court of appeal considered converting an appeal of an unappealable judgment into an application for a supervisory writ. In this post, we’ll focus on two cases presenting this issue, plus a twist: in both cases, the would-be appellant had already applied for a supervisory writ, but the court of appeal denied the writ.

The first case is MAPP Construction, LLC v. Amerisure Mutual Insurance Co., 2013-1074 (La. App. 1 Cir. 3/24/14), 143 So. 3d 520. Here is the timeline:

  • Sept. 25, 2012: The trial court rendered the judgment complained of. The aggrieved party, C & F, filed a timely application for a supervisory writ.
  • Feb. 13, 2013: The court of appeal denied the writ application, commenting that the judgment would become appealable once a pending motion for new trial was ruled on.
  • Mar. 20, 2013: The trial court denied the motion for new trial, and C & F took a suspensive appeal.

The appeal panel, disagreeing with the writ panel, concluded that the September 25 judgment was not appealable. Id., p. 10, 143 So. 3d at 528. Nevertheless, even though the appeal was taken well beyond the 30-day period to apply for a supervisory writ, the appeal panel converted the appeal into a supervisory writ. Why? “Because C & F initially filed a timely supervisory writ application and we find clear error in the trial court's second judgment that will create a grave injustice iif not corrected, we will convert the appeal to an application for a supervisory writ, grant the writ, and review the second judgment rendered on September 25, 2012.” Id., pp. 10–11, 143 So. 3d at 528. Thus, the prior writ application, although denied, helped persuade the court to convert the later appeal into a writ application.

In Kirby v. Poydras Center, LLC, 2015-0027 (La. App. 4 Cir. 9/23/15), 176 So. 3d 601, the court reached the opposite conclusion, declining to convert an appeal into an application for supervisory writ because of its prior denial of a writ application from the same judgment. After rendition of the judgment complained of, the aggrieved party simultaneously appealed and applied for a supervisory writ. The writ panel denied the application. Later, the appeal panel decided not to convert the appeal into an application for supervisory writ because of the prior writ denial. The court reasoned that converting the appeal into a writ application would be “repetitious,” suggesting a rule of one writ application per customer for any particular judgment. Id., p. 12, 176 So. 3d at 608.

So what is the lesson here? A prior writ application, though denied, may help persuade the court to convert a later appeal into a writ application. Or it may have the opposite effect. When review is discretionary (as it always is with writ applications), nothing is certain.


Converting appeals into writ applications

When litigants attempt to appeal a non-appealable judgment, the question rises whether the court of appeal can review the trial court’s judgment under its supervisory jurisdiction. In at least four of the five circuits, the answer is “maybe,” if the motion for appeal was filed within the 30-day period to apply for a supervisory writ under Unif. R. 4-3. (I couldn’t find any cases from the Second Circuit answering this question.) Here is a breakdown of the cases, circuit by circuit.

First Circuit

Roba, Inc. v. Courtney, 2009-0509, p. 6 n. 12 (La. App. 1 Cir. 8/10/10), 47 So. 3d 509, 514 n. 12 (appeal converted to application for supervisory writ where motion for devolutive appeal was filed within the 30-day period under Unif. R. 4-3).

Joseph v. Ratcliff, 2010-1342, p. 7 (La. App. 1 Cir. 3/25/11), 63 So. 3d 220, 225 (because party’s motion for appeal was filed more than 30 days after notice of judgment, “we will not convert the appeal of that judgment to an application for supervisory writs.").

Tower Credit, Inc. v. Bradley, 2015-1164, p. 4 9La. App. 1 Cir. 4/15/16), — So. 3d —, 2016 WL 1534851 (because motion for appeal was filed 40 days after notice of judgment, it “was filed too late to invoke the supervisory jurisdiction of this court.”).

Third Circuit

Biosonix, LLC v. Luke, 2014-1207, pp. 4-5 (La. App. 3 Cir. 5/27/15), 165 So. 3d 399, 401 ("Had the motion for appeal been filed within this thirty-day window, we would have deemed it a timely notice of intent to seek supervisory writs. However, the Motion for Appeal was filed after the thirty-day period lapsed. Thus, even if we were to allow Plaintiffs time to perfect a proper writ application, we would have to dismiss that writ application because of untimeliness.").

Rain CII Carbon, LLC v. Turner Indus. Group, LLC, 14-121, p. 2 (La. App. 3 Cir. 3/19/14), 161 So. 3d 688, 689 ("This court, in the interest of justice, permits parties—who use the improper procedural vehicle of appeal instead of supervisory writ—to file a writ application when a motion for appeal is filed within thirty days after the trial court’t ruling. [Citation omitted.] In doing so, we construe the motion for appeal as a notice of intent to seek a supervisory writ. [¶] Here, the motion for appeal was not filed within thirty days of the trial court’s verbal ruling denying Victory’s exceptions. Therefore, while Victory’s motion for appeal can be construed to be a notice of intent to seek supervisory writs, it cannot be construed as a timely one.”).

Babineaux v. University Med. Center, 15-292, p. 7 (La. App. 3 Cir. 11/4/15), 177 So. 3d 1120, 1125 (appeal dismissed and not converted to supervisory-writ application because the motion for appeal "was filed in the trial court, at best, ... thirty-two days after the judgment” sought to be reviewed).

Duckering v. Rapides Healthcare Sys., LLC, 15-1049, pp. 4-5 (La. App. 3 Cir. 3/2/16), 187 So. 3d 548, 551-52 (court precluded from converting appeal into a supervisory-writ application because petition for appeal was not filed within 30 days of notice of judgment).

Fourth Circuit

Board of Supervisors of LSU v. Mid-City Holdings, LLC, 2014-0506, pp. 3-4 (La. App. 4 Cir. 10/15/14), 151 So. 3d 908, 911. (This is the leading case on this issue in the Fourth Circuit. The court notes that it has “ordinarily but not necessarily” converted appeals of non-appealable judgments into applications for supervisory writs when the motion for appeal was filed within 30 days after notice of judgment. The court also cited Herlitz Construction Co. v. Hotel Investors of New Iberia, 396 So. 2d 878 (La. 1981) as supporting the exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction.)

Ramirez v. Evonir, LLC, 2014-1095, pp. 4-6 (La. App. 4 Cir. 4/9/15), 165 So. 3d 260, 263 (conversion to supervisory-writ application denied because the motion for appeal was filed well beyond 30 days after notice of judgment and the case did not meet the Herlitz criteria).

McGinn v . Crescent City Connection Bridge Auth., 2015-0165, pp. 4–6 (La. App. 4 Cir. 7/22/15), 174 So. 3d 145, 148 (The court cited two conditions that must be met to convert an appeal into a supervisory-writ application: (1) motion for appeal filed within 30 days after notice of judgment, and (2) immediate appeal “necessary to ensure fundamental fairness and judicial efficiency, such as where reversal of the trial court’s decision would terminate the litigation.” Because the motion for appeal was filed more than 30 days after notice of judgment “we decline to exercise our discretion to consider the motion for appeal as an application for supervisory writ.”)

 Zeigler v. Housing Authority of New Orleans, 2015-0626, pp. 3-4 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/23/16), — So. 3d —, 2016 WL 1165437 (because motion for appeal was filed within 30 days after notice of judgment, court exercised its discretion to convert the appeal into an application for supervisory writ).

Federal Work Ready, Inc. v. Wright, 2015-1301, p. 3 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/18/16), — So. 3d —, 2016 WL 2910291 (same as Zeigler).

 Fifth Circuit

Sellers v. El Paso Indus. Energy, LP, 08-403, p. 17 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2/10/09), 8 So. 3d 723, 732 (court denied conversion of an answer to an appeal into a supervisory-writ application because the answer was filed beyond the 30-day period to apply for a supervisory writ).

Patterson v. Fed Ex Ground Package Sys., Inc., 08-1297, p. 4 (La. App. 5 Cir. 3/24/09), 10 So. 3d 794, 796 (“[T]he motion for appeal was filed within the time requirements for a writ application. By en banc meeting of December 9, 2004, this Court decided that converting appeals to writs will be left to the discretion of the panel. Under the circumstances of this case and in the interest of justice, we deny FedEx’s Motion to Dismiss Appeal, convert the appeal to a writ, and review the matter under our supervisory jurisdiction.”)

Note that the granting of a supervisory writ is always discretionary. Thus, a party is never entitled to have its appeal of a non-appealable judgment converted to a supervisory writ, even if the motion for appeal was filed within 30 days after notice of judgment.

A final note: there are two cases in which the prior filing and denial of an application for a supervisory writ influenced the court’s decision to convert an appeal into a writ application. Ironically, they reached opposite results. The cases are MAPP Construction, LLC v. Amerisure Mutual Insurance Co., 2013-1074 (La. App. 1 Cir. 3/24/14), 143 So. 3d 520 (converting appeal into writ application), and Kirby v. Poydras Center, LLC, 2015-27 (La. App. 4 Cir. 9/23/15), 176 So. 3d 601 (denying conversion into writ application). We’ll look at those cases more closely in a later post.